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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the macroeconomic effects of trade policy, when the 
instrument is a voluntary export restraint (VER), on both the home (imposing) country and 
the foreign (targeted) country.  The innovation in the paper is the analysis of trade policy 
when debt servicing is present in the current account of the balance of payments.  This 
captures the contemporary experience of deficit nations like the USA vis-à-vis surplus 
countries like China. Trade policy (VER) in the short-run affects the current account and 
exchange rate, leading to the accumulation of debt stocks, which have to be repaid in the 
long-run in the form of debt servicing flows.  This leads to a major difference between the 
short and long-run effects of trade policy in the form of VERs, which can be expansionary 
and contractionary respectively for the trade policy initiating nation.                       
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
It would be a truism to state that the current global economic contraction is deemed to be the 
most significant global economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s. The present 
predicament originated in a financial crisis that had repercussions for the real economy, and was 
rapidly transmitted from the United States to the rest of the world. The national income 
compressions that followed were, however, asymmetric, with many dynamic Asian economies 
only experiencing a decline in their (positive) growth rates, while other countries (developed and 
developing) nations witnessed a diminution of their national income. All of this occurred against 
the backdrop of what has come to be known as ‘global imbalances’. This refers to the differences 
between deficit nations like the United States (which also simultaneously runs a huge 
government budget deficit), the UK and many other European nations, and the surplus countries 
exemplified by China (which has become the world’s largest exporter of goods and the second 
largest economy in absolute terms), Japan, Germany and many other Asian economies. 
Furthermore, the vast trade surpluses of countries like China are not, in the main, absorbed 
domestically, but instead held in the form of safe short-term dollar denominated assets such as 
US treasury bills. It has been argued that this behaviour is predicated on a precautionary principle 
leading China into hoarding a war chest of financial reserves (in dollars) to be deployed in the 
event of a speculative attack on its currency. Haunted by the spirit of financial crises past in the 
East Asian region, China is also reluctant to fully liberalize capital account transactions in its 
balance of payments.   
 
The recent global recession has also seen a dramatic contraction in world trade, unparalleled 
since the inter-war period associated with the great depression. Although trade is predicted to 
recover, this sort of negative shock in an otherwise globalizing economy for the last half a 
century, can engender a phenomenon known as trade uncertainty; see van Bergeijk (2009) and 
references therein. Uncertainty about the smooth functioning of the channels of future 
international trade can have an independent, and additional, adverse effect on the real economy. 
Added to that is the loss of confidence that characterises deep depressions, as opposed to more 
temporary recessions. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) refer to this as the confidence multiplier, 
something that is unusually buoyant in the boom years prior to the recession, and equally 
stubbornly gloomy in refusing to revive during the course of a depression. When the confidence 
is low, the expansionary impact of the usual fiscal and monetary stimuli is much more muted, as 
in the case of Japan since the early 1990s. Akerlof and Shiller (2009) also point out that when 
economic confidence is at its nadir, individualized stories about corruption and other nefarious 
activities contributing the downturn abound in the popular mind. Apart from the usual suspects 
(bankers and financiers), blame may also be laid at the feet of nations such as China for 
‘exporting too much’, and a revival of confidence might necessitate the politically attractive 
option of some bilateral trade policy restricting goods from China into the USA (or Europe for 
that matter); see Grossman and Helpman (1994) on how lobby groups induce specific forms of 
protectionism via political campaign contributions. There are frequent accusations levied against 
China for gaining ‘unfair’ competitive advantage by artificially engineering real exchange rate 
devaluation. The Chinese are also charged with being a nation of excessive savers, compared to 
the negative saving propensities of American households, where arguably a different brand of 
consumer capitalism abounds (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). Trade policy targeted specifically 
towards China could also serve to reduce trade uncertainty as described and analyzed in van 
Bergeijk (2009). The multilateral framework governing international trade could then be 
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complemented and supplemented by bilateral negotiations; this too can become a part of 
economic diplomacy (van Bergeijk, 2009).  
 
Recently there has been a revival of ‘Keynesian’ demand management policies that aim to 
increase output and employment via boosting aggregate demand. Keynes (1936) himself came 
around to the view that protectionism could also provide a macroeconomic boost during a deep 
recession.  Exports are a component of aggregate demand and imports represent a leakage from 
domestic demand, hence policies that switch expenditure from foreign to domestic sources would 
raise domestic aggregate demand via. One instrument that achieves this goal could be bilateral 
trade policies that restrict imports from a major source. It is not inconceivable that a powerful 
nation such as the United States (arguably the post-war engine of global economic growth) might 
convince a major foreign supplier to its market like China to restrict its sales within the USA out 
of fear of greater future disruption, were the American economy to falter even further. A potential 
future threat of greater trade disruption may induce China to reduce its current sales in the USA 
in order to preserve orderly economic relations in the foreseeable future, thereby granting a 
Keynesian boost to the US economy.       
   
Trade policy could also become a substitute for the traditional instruments of stabilisation 
(fiscal/monetary) policy, given the constraints placed on the other policy instruments because of 
growing central bank independence, and the burgeoning debt following the 2008 financial crisis 
in ‘deficit’ nations like the USA or the UK, for example. It could also be a means of 
redistributing income towards factors of production in certain industries.  It has been argued that 
trade policy has small direct output effects when compared with fiscal/monetary policy.  But such 
an assertion neglects the real exchange consequences of trade policy in its various forms.  Real 
exchange rate changes result from the balance of payments effects of trade policy.  These have 
consequences not only for international competitiveness, but also for debt servicing flows.  
Changes in debt servicing flows have, in turn, income and output repercussions.  In order to 
explore these debt servicing implications for the macroeconomy, it is necessary to distinguish 
between the short and long-run, as pioneered by Rodriguez (1979) who analyzed fiscal and 
monetary policy in the presence of debt servicing within a single small open economy setting.     
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of trade policy in the form of a voluntary export 
restraint (VER) on the macroeconomies of both the home (imposing) country and the foreign 
(targeted) country.  The analytical treatment of a VER differs from that applicable to a traditional 
tariff or quota, as it is the exporter and not the importer who obtains the revenues from the trade 
restriction.  Trade policy in the form of a VER is inherently bilateral in nature and it is the 
favoured form of trade policy engaged in by countries or blocs such as the United States (or even 
the European Union) when the target of the trade policy is a particular country, China say.  This 
is the example in mind in this paper. A VER is also relatively more WTO compatible. 
 
The literature on the macroeconomic analyses of VERs is relatively scant.  Examples of the latter 
include Murshed (1992) who compares VERs with tariffs in the North-South context, and 
Murshed and Sen (1999) who analyze the capital account effects of VERs.  The innovation in this 
paper is the analysis of trade policy in the form of VERs when debt servicing enters the current 
account of the balance of payments.  Current account deficits lead to the accumulation of the 
stock of debt which has to be repaid in the future in the form of debt servicing flows.  This leads 
to a difference between the short and long-run effects of trade policy in the form of VERs.  In the 
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short-run the effects of VER type trade policy impact on the current account.  These current 
account changes eventually cause alterations in debt stocks, requiring debt servicing.   In the 
long-run equilibrium, by definition, no changes in stocks are possible, and appropriate 
adjustments to bring this about must take place in the economy.  Thus, in the long-run, the debt 
servicing implications of the VER will have fully worked their way through the economies in 
question.  This can lead to the reversal of the short-run effects of the VER in the long-run.  The 
rest of the paper is organised as follows: section II contains a sketch of the two country 
macroeconomic model; Sections III and IV contain the short and long-run effects respectively of 
trade policy; finally section V briefly concludes.                      
 
II.  THE MODEL  
 
We will employ a two country variant of the Rodriguez (1979) model.  We ignore the monetary 
side of the economy as we wish to focus on the (debt servicing inclusive) current account effects 
of the VER.  Although our model does not explicitly incorporate imperfect competition in 
product markets, the presence of excess capacity in goods markets brings about the same flavour 
in our results as imperfect (monopolistic) competition. 
 
The equilibrium relation for the home (VER imposing) country's goods market is given by: 
 
where Y stands for income; E for expenditure; X for exports; X
*
 for imports; e for the exchange 
rate, a rise in e is a depreciation (appreciation) of the home (foreign) currency; the stock of debt, 
D, is in one unit of home currency (say dollars) and can be either positive or negative; rD 
represents debt servicing, r is the relevant interest rate; v is the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of the 
VER quota, following Brecher and Bhagwati (1987).  Expenditure depends on debt servicing 
augmented disposable income, E1 > 0.  E2 > 0, this is the Laursen-Metzler (1950) effect, see 
Murshed (1997, chapter2, pp. 25-27) for a detailed derivation.  Our argument for its inclusion is 
that it played an important role in Mundell's (1961) seminal work on the macroeconomic effects 
of tariffs.  E2 = X
*
(1-ε), ε < 1 is the elasticity of real expenditure with respect to real income.  The 
intuition behind it is that an exchange rate depreciation lowers real income (defined in terms of 
home and imported goods prices), but real expenditure declines less than proportionately, hence 
nominal expenditure increases.  X1 > 0, X2 > 0, X1
*
 > 0, X2
*
 < 0.  Note that we have normalised 
domestic and foreign prices at P=P
*
=1.  The initial VER rate, v=0, but dv0.   
 
An asterisk (*) denotes foreign country variables.  Goods market equilibrium in the foreign 
economy is given by: 
 
Y* = E*(Y*-
rD
e
+vX*;
1
e
)+X*(Y+rD;e(1+v))-
X
e
(Y*-
rD
e
+vX*;e)  (2) 
In (2) the exchange rate is employed in the opposite direction of the home country.  The signs of 
the various partial derivatives in (2) are symmetrical to those in (1).  It should be borne in mind 
that the VER rent accrues to the exporting country, unlike a tariff or quota when rents are 
retained by the importer. Thus, the foreign economy potentially benefits from a positive income 
effect, just as the home economy should gain from a price or substitution effect shifting 
)1)(1))(1(;();())1(;( *** vverDYeXevX
e
rD
YXverDYEY   
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expenditure towards its own goods. 
 
The current account of the balance of payments is defined for the home economy, exactly the 
converse applies to the foreign economy.  We include debt servicing flows (rD) in addition to the 
difference between exports and imports (trade account) in the current account, following 
Rodriguez (1979).  D stands for the stock of debt denominated in home currency units, rD 
denotes debt servicing flows where r is the interest rate on debt.  The current account, therefore, 
has two components, trade balance and debt servicing flows: 
 
D = X(.) - eX*(.)(1 + v) + rD 
The above relation states that current account surpluses will contribute to the home country's 
becoming a creditor (or a reduction in its indebted status) as D is accumulated, similarly current 
account deficits will contribute to its becoming a debtor (or a diminution of its creditor ranking).  
In the short-run the inherited debt stocks are non-zero, D0.  Current account imbalances arising 
from the impact of the VER will, however, lead to changes in the stock of debt which have to be 
eliminated in the long-run equilibrium. We postulate that the home (foreign) country deficits 
(surpluses) causes the exchange rate to depreciate (appreciate), i.e. e rises:   
e = eX*(.)(1 + v) - X(.) - rD   (3) 
 
  
In order to proceed we totally differentiate (1)-(3), and arrange them in matrix form: 
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Next we investigate the stability of the model.  The trace is negative if a33 < 0; the Marshall-
Lerner conditions hold, i.e. if an exchange rate depreciation (rise in e) improves the domestic 
trade balance and vice versa.  The determinant of the Jacobian, J = 
 
(E
1
-1)
rDX
1
e2
 + (E
1
-1)(E
*
1
-1)(X*+eX
*
2
-X
2
+
X
1
Xε
e2
) - (1-E
*
1
)eX
*
1
X*ε  (5) 
A requirement of stability is that (5) is negative.  This is so only if a33 < 0; if the Marshall-Lerner 
conditions hold.  If D > 0, this is also sufficient; if D < 0, then X > rD, the indebted  (home) 
country's export revenues must exceed debt servicing. 
 
III.  SHORT-RUN MULTIPLIERS 
 
We now analyze the short-run or impact multipliers of the system.  As far as these multipliers are 
concerned we postulate, as in Rodriguez (1979), that dD = 0, but D  0.  This means that on 
impact the historically given debt stocks cannot change, but the inherited stock of debt may be 
positive or negative.  If D > 0 the home country is the creditor nation, but if D < 0 it is the foreign 
economy which is the creditor country.  Turning to the multipliers we find that:   
 
 
divided through by J < 0, given from (5) above.  dY/dv > 0 only if (i)  X2 >X1 and (ii) X1 > ε in 
absolute value.  The VER on impact will lead to an improvement in the foreign country's current 
account as long as it receives more revenues for exporting a smaller quantity (a positive VER 
rent). This seems plausible, and is in conformity with the stylised facts when the VER is effected 
by an economy like China, whose export quality appears to be increasing.  What it really implies 
is that the subjects of trade restrictions are high quality goods, which are inelastically demanded. 
The improvement in the foreign economy's current account will lead to its currency appreciating, 
under flexible exchange rates (see equation 8 below). This means that the home country's (the 
USA's) currency depreciates.  This should eventually raise aggregate demand in the home country 
via improvements in net exports.  For this to successfully occur, and raise output, X2 the price 
elasticity of its exports in the foreign country must be high.  Also the home economy benefits 
from a positive Laursen-Metzler effect as its currency depreciates.  This is greater the smaller is 
ε, the elasticity of absorption (expenditure) with respect to real income.  
 
dY
dv
 = [1 - ε][X*X*X
1
- eX
2
X*(1-E
*
1
)- 
rDX
1
X*
e
] +
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e
 (ε - X
1
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divided through by J < 0.  dY
*
/dv is ambiguous in sign. Even though the foreign economy 
benefits from the VER rent, currency appreciation potentially crowds out these gains via the 
deterioration in the trade balance.  Also if it is a creditor economy, rD < 0, it will suffer from a 
negative wealth effect.  This is because D is denominated in dollars, and its value in local 
currency declines as the dollar depreciates (each dollar fetches less in remimbi units). 
 
 
)(  0 > 
J
)] - (1XXe)[E - (1 -)] E - )(1 + (1X1)[e-E(
 = 
dv
de **1
2*
1
*
1
*
1 8

 
This means that the home (foreign) country's exchange rate depreciates (appreciates) as long as  
Ω = eX*2/X
*
, the price elasticity of demand of the restricted import is inelastically demanded (less 
than 1 in absolute value).  This is also a condition for a positive VER rent for China after the 
trade restriction is imposed.  
 
 
IV.  LONG-RUN MULTIPLIERS 
 
The analysis in section III was concerned with impact (short-run) multipliers.  In the long-run 
steady-state equilibrium there must be no change in stocks, which in turn means that the current 
account in totality must balance. The debt servicing implications of the VER fully work through 
the two economies in the long-run.  A trade account surplus must be matched by a negative debt 
servicing inflows and vice versa.  This means that in the steady-state (long-run), dD = 0 but d(rD) 
 0.  Thus, although changes in debt stocks are zero, debt servicing inflows could be non-zero 
(see Rodriguez, 1979).  The mechanism of change in the current account is debt servicing, d(rD) 
replaces de.  Equation (3) is replaced by: 
 
X(.) - eX*(.)(1 + v) + rD = 0  (9) 
 
The various aij in (4) alter as follows (the bij are unaltered): 
 
 
The model is stable and the determinant of the Jacobian now becomes: 
 
+ X*X
*
1
(ε - 1)[E
*
1
rD + εX - eE
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X*]   (7) 
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J = [E
1
-1][1-E
*
1
] - 2X
*
1
X
1
 < 0  (5) 
 
 
Turning to the long-run effects of the VER:  
 
 
 
 
 
dY/dv in the long-run is negative only if  |ε(1 - eX1
*| > |Ω (1 - E1)| in absolute value; dY
*
/dv > 0 if 
| eX1
*| > |Ω|; and |1 -ε| > |1 - E1|,  both in absolute value. 
 
)12(0
)(

dv
de
dv
rDd
 
 
This is positive and can be verified by examining equation (8) above.  It means that the home 
(foreign) economy experiences positive (negative) debt servicing flows in the long-run 
equilibrium. 
 
The intuition behind the above results can be best understood by tracing the movements from the 
impact multipliers in the short-run to the steady-state equilibrium. The effect of the VER for the 
home country in the short-run causes its exchange rate to depreciate, improving its trade balance. 
 This will improve its credit standing, as either its debt is reduced or its creditor position is 
enhanced.  For the foreign economy exchange rate appreciation worsens the trade balance in the 
short-run.  This leads to an accumulation of debt or its previous creditor status is diminished.  In 
the long-run this increased debtor (or reduced creditor status) eventually requires debt servicing 
which needs to be financed via improved export performance.  This increase in net exports is 
precisely what causes the foreign country's output to rise in the long-run equilibrium.  We have 
noted that in the long-run equilibrium the current account in total must balance, there can be no 
changes in debt stocks.  For the home economy the long-run effect of the VER leads to a 
reduction in its trade balance, exactly matched in value by positive debt servicing inflows.   The 
converse results apply to the foreign country.  
 
These results are depicted in figure 1 and 2 for the home and foreign economy respectively, and 
are obtained from the aij coefficients above.  The YY (Y
*
Y
*
) schedule depicts goods market 
equilibrium.  A rise in output increases net imports which has to be matched by positive debt 
servicing making the schedule positive (negative) for the home (foreign) country. A similar line 
of reasoning is applicable to the external balance schedules, rD.  The initial point before the VER 
is indicated at A, and the post VER long-run outcome is shown at point B.      
dY
dv
 = 
[1-E
*
1
][eεX*(1 - eX
*
1
) + eΩX*(1- E
1
) - eX*(E
1
- eX
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1
)]
J
  (10) 
dY*
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1
][eX
*
2
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1
 - 1) - eX*X
*
1
(1 - ε)]
J
  (11) 
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V.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
In summary, therefore, the short (impact) and long-run effects of trade policy in the form of 
VERs could be diametrically opposite, given the presence of debt servicing.  Indeed it can be 
argued that there is a trade off between the short-run and long-run effects.  In the short-run the 
VER causes exchange rate depreciation in the home economy.  This improves its current account 
and raises output in the home country.  In the foreign economy exchange rate appreciation 
crowds out the benefits of the VER rent.  The foreign country's current account surplus worsens 
as its currency gets stronger, lowering output there.  In the long-run, however, the signs of the 
impact multipliers are reversed.  The increase in debt (or the reduction in its creditor status) 
accumulated by the foreign country following the impact effect of the VER has to be paid off 
through increased net exports in the future, which is beneficial to output.  The converse occurs in 
the home economy, where the short-run benefits of the improved trade balance are lost in the 
long-run, and its equilibrium output declines.  Both the short and long-run multipliers for the 
VER, as far as the home or VER initiating country is concerned, are similar to the results in 
Rodriguez (1979) for monetary policy in a single country.   
 
The moral of the story is that Keynesian minded trade policies aiming to boost domestic output 
may not work in the long-term when debt has to be re-paid, and that the debtor status of countries 
like the United States cannot be deemed to last indefinitely. Furthermore, politically expedient 
trade policies that are at least partially engineered by lobbying groups that target specific 
exporters and are aimed at rebuilding business confidence have differential short and long-run 
effects; the latter typically being fully discounted by the almost universally myopic political 
process.  
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